Olga Korabliova,
expert at the NGO "Institute of Peace and Understanding" (IMiP)
Safety is a prerequisite for comfortable living in one's city. Residents feel safe when several factors are provided: low crime, well-developed infrastructure including effective lighting and safe roads, an environmental situation sufficient for a full life, and no threat to life and health. From a human-centered perspective, for residents to feel safe they must have a consensual (shared by the whole community) confidence that, in case of danger, local institutions will protect them and provide effective assistance. From a managerial perspective, for such public confidence to form in a community it is necessary to ensure the effective functioning of all systems related to security.
Organizing management of the security system at the local level has become a new challenge for Ukraine's communities in recent years. Features of the country’s socio-political context have altered how security is organized in communities. Two main factors currently affecting communities when implementing security programs are armed conflict and the process of decentralization. In this article we examine how these two objective factors modify security management, overlaying local security risks, and we propose tools for building local security in communities under such complex conditions.
Security in communities in this article it is used to mean the range of infrastructure and measures that enable community residents to feel safe and comfortable regardless of their membership in any social group.
Community in the text it is not used in the general sense denoting any type of community—villages, towns—but rather in the legislative meaning of the Law of Ukraine "On Voluntary Association of Territorial Communities": "An amalgamated territorial community whose administrative center is designated as a city is an urban territorial community; if the center is designated as an urban-type settlement, it is a settlement territorial community; if the center is designated as a village, it is a rural territorial community.", i.e., ATCs and prospective ATCs.
Armed conflict and community security
The armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea continue to affect Ukrainian society and directly or indirectly influence the sense of security in the vast majority of the country’s communities. Since the spring of 2014, with the outbreak of separatist movements in parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, armed aggression began in the East and the Crimean peninsula was seized, causing deep polarization within Ukrainian communities. From 2014 to 2020, legal proceedings concerning discrimination and terrorist acts in Crimea have been heard at the International Criminal Court, and the Joint Forces Operation in Donbas has continued. At present it is impossible to predict the end of the armed conflict or the return of Crimea to state control. This negatively affects stability in areas adjacent to the line of contact and in southern regions, leading to polarization among population groups and local conflicts in communities during 2014–2020.
What is key to stability in community security is that the armed actions and the annexation of Crimea had not only external geopolitical causes but also internal structural factors:
- dependence of the political process on oligarchic interests;
- instability of state institutions;
- an underdeveloped political culture and low public trust in government.
Under these circumstances the state implemented a number of measures. At the start of the military response to violent actions an Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) began, later replaced by the Joint Forces Operation (JFO). Social measures were also introduced, such as programs for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the process of decommunization as a response to Russian propaganda and to strengthen identity. Although these measures were aimed at the strategic stabilization of the country’s security situation, they caused complications at the local level in communities. It is important to take into account the heterogeneity of Ukrainian society and the existence of a spectrum of Ukrainian identities.
Citizens' identities are multi‑faceted and are formed by a combination of political views, ethnic affiliation, religion, economic well‑being, and social status. The vast majority of communities have felt the effects of the conflict. Many towns and villages have received internally displaced persons; demobilized ATO fighters have returned; relatives of fallen soldiers also live there, and the economic consequences are tangible. For example, the environmental situation is worsening due to loss of access to high‑quality anthracite coal—the mines are located in non‑government‑controlled territories—so heating is carried out with brown coal, which has lower calorific value and produces more emissions. The process of decommunization and the protection of the Ukrainian language and culture has deepened divisions within communities across the country. The main conflict in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, as interconnected events, together with the government’s reaction in terms of radicalization and nationalization of policy and discourse, have provoked local conflicts within communities between social groups based on ethnic background, political views, support for pro‑Russian or European positions, and so on.
In Kharkiv, the dispute over the demolition of the Lenin monument split residents into several camps. In September 2014, pro‑Ukrainian groups, fighters from the Azov battalion, representatives of Kharkiv’s Euromaidan and the “Public Guard,” and local ultras removed the Lenin monument during a public action, reportedly to prevent the development of separatist movements in Kharkiv. Residents were divided in their attitudes toward the demolition: some supported radical decommunization, while others criticized the arbitrary dismantling and advocated less radical methods of decommunization, expressed solidarity with the mayor, and demanded the monument’s restoration. This provoked a confrontation between the regional administration and the mayor’s office and created tension within the city. The case attracted wide public attention and involved the broader community in the debate. The socio‑political confrontation between ideological opponents was ultimately resolved and social tension reduced through a dialogue process.
Photo: Oleksiy Holubov
In summary, the armed conflict creates additional security risks for communities. The broader social context of armed aggression causes rising social tension and instability in communities. This creates a risk of local conflicts emerging against a backdrop of political instability, societal polarization, and escalating social tension, which ultimately leads to instability within communities.
Decentralization and security
Decentralization reform that began in 2014 changed the approach to managing security at the local level. United territorial communities gained the authority and responsibility to organize local security systems. Changes in legislation on local self-government and public safety foresee a shift from a centrally managed security structure, previously overseen by central executive authorities, to local self-government bodies. The Law of Ukraine "On Local Self-Government" establishes that organizing the civil protection system falls within the competence of local councils and is headed by the head of the united territorial community (Art. 42 of the Law of Ukraine "On Local Self-Government"; Art. 19, para. 2 of the Civil Protection Code of Ukraine).
Having gained freedom in planning security strategies, territorial communities have faced a number of challenges related to building infrastructure while simultaneously accumulating knowledge and managerial competencies among local government staff and authorities. Building the organizational infrastructure of united territorial communities proved problematic because they are effectively new territorial entities that require creating new bodies from scratch. Another challenge has been the lack of practical knowledge about organizing decentralization.
For example, with the formation of united territorial communities in Vinnytsia Oblast and a parallel police reform in communities, which included, among other things, a reduction of district police officers in the regions, Severynivska United Territorial Community — whose population exceeds 5,000 — was left with only two district officers, who could not cover the territory and all required tasks. Responsibility for organizing and ensuring security at the community level therefore fell to local self-government bodies. The local community accepted the challenge, and the village council and civic organizations joined forces to create a rapid response center for security threats. Local volunteers monitor dangers using a video surveillance system and, if necessary, relay information to the relevant authorities. Involving local residents in building security provides two advantages for community sustainability:
- Residents have the fullest understanding of the dangers and risks present in their community;
- Interaction among local self-government bodies, law enforcement agencies and citizens helps build trust within the community under the difficult conditions of decentralization.
A significant portion of resources and budget-management powers has also been transferred to local self-government bodies. In addition to being able to manage and plan security-sector spending from the local budget, OTGs (territorial communities) can seek additional funding from special state funds, for example the State Fund for Regional Development (DFRR), and apply for subventions to develop community infrastructure. Thus, decentralization has brought communities not only challenges but also opportunities for effective local-level security work.
Each territorial community has gained the ability to respond to security threats specific to it, account for all local risk factors, and create a warning and response system that will make that community safer. When factors that cause local-level security threats combine with broader security threats, this can lead to armed conflict. Responding to such multi-level security risks may require devising sustainable, community-level solutions aimed at overcoming both local and national security threats. Ultimately, this addresses both the risks of national armed conflict and specific local risks.
To achieve sustainable, consistent decisions and build trust between institutions and citizens locally, every community needs a permanent platform for interaction and conflict resolution. One nonviolent conflict-resolution and decision-making practice is the use of dialogue. Through a facilitated process for discussing responses to security problems, community residents and local self-government bodies can not only reach mutual understanding but also create space for systematic communication and cooperation. Security-related dialogue practices at the community level reduce social tension between groups with different political positions and identities. Ultimately, this helps mitigate the consequences of social divisions caused by armed conflict.
Regular interactions at the community level reduce conflict potential when peace in the classical sense—an end to armed conflict—is difficult to achieve. As the theory of “everyday peace” holds, daily interaction between polarized groups interrupts the conflict and breaks the dominant war narrative, introducing practices of mutual respect and cooperation. Therefore, holding dialogues on security in the context of an ongoing armed conflict helps reduce the intensity of threats caused by the conflict in the East and the annexation of Crimea.
The process of decentralization and the transfer of powers and resources to communities is a local state-building process that also requires cooperation among different community actors through democratic practices. Dialogue, which becomes a permanent tool of interaction within the community, fosters democratic development, encourages residents’ participation in security governance, and builds trust in institutions and the community as a whole.
We cannot predict when or under which scenario the conflict will end. For now, communities must take measures and respond to conflict-related threats. Decentralization is nearing completion, yet communities still need to develop democratic grassroots practices. That security governance has shifted to the responsibility of hromadas (amalgamated territorial communities) can be seen as an opportunity to strengthen community resilience. First, communities now have the authority and resources for security infrastructure. Second, creating a platform for cooperation among stakeholders helps build trust and resilient ties between residents, local self-government bodies, the police, and other parties.
